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V
I used the terms “ontological order” and “logos” above to characterize 
the “law” or “dharma” which manifests itself, for example, in the phe­
nomenon of a cock crowing at daybreak.1 Ordinarily this logos is con­
ceived of as the essential rational law inherent in the being of “things” 
itself and is regarded in philosophy as the object of cognition of “reason” 
or the speculative intellect. In modem times it has also come to acquire 
a character of scientific law as the object of cognition through the 
faculty of discursive “understanding” in science.
1 Eastern Buddhist rx, I, pp. 65, 68 ff.
I have reiterated that, on the field of this logos, the intrinsic “selfness” 
of a thing, whatever it may be, can never be grasped. This would seem to 
contradict what I have stated above about true existence (i.e., ec-sistence) 
as “dropped off body-and-mind,” that this ec-sistence means the hold­
ing in grasp of all things or phenomena in their home-ground, that is, 
in their being-in-themselves and in their dharmic character of being— 
what we can also describe by saying that it is in grasp of all things in their 
logos.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the logos of beingness comes to 
have a qualitatively different significance according to whether it is seen 
from the standpoint of reason or from the standpoint of ec-sistence.
Logos has also the meaning of “word” or “speech.” On the standpoint 
of cc-sistence, it takes on the meaning of koto (a Japanese word signifying 
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both “affair” and “word”).2 Here, the rational law of being is, as such, 
word or speech. Just as the promulgated law is a kind of voiceless speech 
that shows men the orbit their social lives should follow, so the rational 
law of being is, under the grasp of the King Samadhi, the voiceless speech 
of one who “makes himself Master wherever he is.” It is his preaching of 
the law (dharma), his seppS.
a IM., p. 54.
Of course, although we speak of “seppS” (the preaching of dharmas 
with words), that! is not to suggest that words exist apart from dharma, 
because here the dharma itself is, as such, the word uttered in preaching: 
the dharma is always preaching itself in and through phenomena, of 
which it is the dharma. So, in this case, preaching may be called a 
preaching without words, or a preaching of non-preaching. Further, as 
there is no dharma existing apart from phenomena or “things” of which 
it is the dharma, we can say that in the preaching of dharma it is things 
that preach. Through their being such as they are, things themselves are 
manifesting their own dharma. And while they are preaching about their 
own dharmas, we can say that things preach about themselves. Of course, 
we can also say that the dharma preaches about things whose own in­
trinsic “nature” it shapes. These four aspects—that the dharma is preach­
ing itself in phenomena; that the dharma is preaching about pheno­
mena; that phenomena are preaching about the dharma; and that they 
arc preaching about themselves—come to one and the same affair [koto). 
And the whole makes up the meaning of the seppo (the dharma preaching).
But then, there is a “lord” who without preaching himself makes things 
preach the dharma. He makes them manifest their own dharma, 
letting, at the same time, things manifest themselves, and also makes 
the dharma preach itself as well as about things. After all, the dharma is 
no other than this lord’s preaching of non-preaching.
Now, in the mode of being of “things” themselves in Emptiness, “being 
as they arc” and “being as they ought to be” arc, as I have said, entirely 
one. And on the field of this “oneness,” logos as koto (signifying affair and 
word) appears, and the dharmic nature of the being of “things” there 
becomes discernible. “Being” on that field is, as such, “being as it ought to 
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be,” which means that in this being, the character of compliance with an 
order is manifesting itself. It signifies a presence of some word of directive 
command {Gehass in Heidegger’s terms). In the dharma-like nature 
of “things” which are as they ought to be, is a character of hearing and 
obeying. This dharma-like nature denotes the law-command of the “lord” 
with his “body and mind dropped off.” It is even his “categorical im­
perative.”
Here, logos or koto as rational law—“ratio” and “law” in their ontolo­
gical sense—indicates the fundamental mode of being of things on the very 
field where they are presenting themselves in their being at their roots, 
so to speak, and at the same time implies that this is the mode of being they 
originally ought to exist in. That things au fundamentally means, 
first, that they are expressing themselves, and second, that in expressing 
themselves they at the same time give expression to that which makes 
them be. They also indicate, give evidence of, and bear witness to it. 
This is the same as saying that things are in a dharmic mode. In reference 
to the first side of this, we have stated that things are preaching the dharma, 
and to the other side, that things hear and obey the dharmic order. Both 
arc one in the dharmic nature of being.
It might sound strange to say that things are preaching the dharma, or 
that they are speaking of the logos. But it is always from things that we 
know the rational law. It is from things that we hear. All our knowledge 
springs from and returns to the place where, in Bashd’s words, we should 
Learn from the pine tree
The koto of the pine tree, 
Learn from the bamboo
The koto of the bamboo.
The pine is telling the koto of the pine tree, the bamboo the koto of the 
bamboo. Our “knowing about rational law or logos always begins from 
and ends in the place where things are speaking of themselves, of their 
own koto] in other words, where things arc on their own home-ground 
and in their suchness, revealing thcmslcvcs as they really are. For, that 
things “arc” as they really are and that they are speaking of their own 
“koto” is one and the same thing.
Now I said that, in their dharmic nature, “things” give expression 
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and bear evidence or witness to3 that by virtue of which they are. What 
they give evidence and bear witness to is none other than the ec-sistence 
of “body-mind dropped off” and “dropped-off body-mind” that opens 
itself up as the field of “emptiness” which makes things be in 
their “origin” (that is, as they are and ought to be). It is none other 
than the “self in satori” indicated in Dogen’s saying: “That the self carries 
itself to all things (dharmas) to practice and confirm them is illusion; 
that all things (dharmas) come forward to practice and confirm the self 
is satori (enlightenment).” This self in satori is precisely that which makes 
itself “master” or “lord” wherever it may be.
3 The Japanese word "akashi" means at once to clarify or make dear, to reveal or 
make known, and to testify, or make proof of.
Therefore, when I said above that the dharma of “things” (in their 
dharmic mode of being) has at once the character of preaching the dharma 
and of obeying the dharma, that which this dharma gives “evidence” and 
bears “witness” to, or, in other words, that which makes the dharma at 
once preach itself and obey itself, and hence, finally, that which preaches 
and commands within this dharma, is none other than the “self” in the 
sense I have just mentioned. It is the self as the selfless, or ego-less.
Just as a scene in which cars and pedestrians stop and go in accordance 
with the change of a traffic signal demonstrates traffic law and hence 
also the legislating “man” (juridical person), so in phenomena such as 
a leap year coming one year in four, or hearing a cock crow at day­
break—the fact that all things are “lawfully natural”—there is to be 
seen the manifestation of “man” as legislator. It is “man,” impersonal 
as “the selfless,” yet personal as the “self.”
In a word, there appears a storehouse holding all rational laws 
gathered up by virtue of the ec-sistence of “dropped-off body-and- 
mind.” Here, all things, through being gathered and maintained in the 
hands of that ec-sistence, are made “things in the world”; just as Dogen 
says, “Through my now exerting myself, every thing and every dharma 
comes to present itself” (ShdbdgenzS Uji).
Thus, in the standpoint of ec-sistence, logos as the rational law of 
being is not different from the law-like character in the primal mode of 
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being of all things, not different from everything’s being itself, such as it 
is, and not different from things being manifest as themselves. Here, 
logos is, as such, the being-as-it-is-ncss (aseitas) of every thing. It is, in 
other words, “like-ness” in its ontological sense as as-it-is-ness, suchness, 
or thusness (always with a connotation of “truc-ness” of a thing truly pre­
senting itself4). And again, logos is the “true thusness” which ultimately 
can be attributed to the “Thus Coming” (Tathagata).
* “The Standpoint of Sunyata,” Eastern Buddhist vi, I, p. 89, and vi, 2, p. 75.
As is well-known, Heidegger interpreted “Truth” as Alitheia in its 
original meaning of unhiddenness (Unvtrborgenhtif), in the sense of being 
manifest as it really is. The logos of things in “emptiness” can be said to 
be “truth” in this sense. And where all “things” are primally and origi­
nally manifesting themselves as they really are, the ec-sistence of 
“dropped-off body-mind” is directly revealing itself alone, as “the solitary 
One revealing itself in all phenomena.” That is to say, the absolute 
“Truth” is there. This is the very place the absolute truth is to be found.
Logos is most originally logos on the home-ground of that ec-sistence. 
And the logos that belongs to the field of speculative reason or to that of 
discursive understanding is something developed from this origin to the 
levels of reason or understanding. Insofar as it is seen only from those 
levels, logos is no longer a real disclosure of things. In order to be a 
true disclosure, logos thus developed must always be brought back to its 
origin, to “empty” ec-sistence, to the ec-sistence which opens itself up as 
the field of “emptiness.”
In this way, such an utterance as “We meet a leap year one in four, 
Cocks crow at four in the morning” refers to an ec-sistence which primarily 
comprehends, in their real suchness and in their lawfulness, all things 
that are in the world of incessant becoming and transition; to an ec- 
sistence which gathers to its own home-ground or to its own “selfless 
self” all things which themselves are each on their own home ground. 
Such an ec-sistence is none other than the ec-sistence of what Ddgen 
called the “dropped-off body-mind.”
This ec-sistence also signifies to exist truly in Time, or rather, as Time. 
It if bottomlessly in Time or as Time which bottomlessly brings itself to 
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its own fullness. In it, the arising (“birth* ’) is non-arising (“non-birth”). 
It is as birth-rwe-non birth. It u as Time, of which it was said before: “time 
is not time, therefore it is time.” In the ec-sistence we are now speaking of, 
“beingness” is one with the “truth” (unhiddcnness) of such Time coming 
into its own. With this ec-sistence one is and lives in the world, wherein
5 Eastern Buddhist IX, I, p. 64.
* Ibid.
Every morning the sun ascends in the east, 
Every night the moon descends in the west. 
Clouds retreat, the mountain bones are bared, 
Rain passes, the surrounding hills arc low.5
One is and lives in the world which is Time, in the World-time, while 
one’s selfless-self, in its lordly ec-sistence, is bringing this Time into its own, 
that is to say, bringing one’s own Self-being to its fullness. Because here 
in true existence (or ec-sistence), true beingness is the same with the ‘’truth” 
of Time, and “to be” means to “be as Time.” While living in the tran­
sience of time one’s life is at every single step “birth-rtiv-non-birth.” It is 
life in which one whiles away one’s time, accepting whatever may come.6
This existence, while always being in time, is always in the beginning 
of time. Though a life given birth through parents, it exists nevertheless 
before the parents were bom. Of course, the “before” in this case is not 
prior in the sense of temporal emergence. Rather, it is “before” the emer­
gence of time. It is the “beginning” of the emergence of Time itself.
Augustine, once asked what God had been doing during the boundless 
stretch of time before the world was created, answered that Time itself 
was created by Him together with the world. In a similar sense, the 
“before” in which the parents were not yet bom is the “before” of Time 
itself, the beginning of the emergence of Time. And this “beginning” 
reveals itself right there where and when the falling away of body and 
mind takes place. It is before even all the temporal “befores” (all the 
beginnings immanent in Time). The beginning of Time itself is before all 
possible pasts. And, at the same time, it is after all possible futures.
Past events, no matter how far back, and future events, no matter how 
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remote, arc all gathered up at this “beginning” of Time. They all come 
into being only as what is gathered at that place. All the possible events 
of past and future can be said to be originally held together in the Time 
which comes into its own as Time from this “beginning.”
In connection with the idea of “transmigration,” I once characterized 
the real nature of birth-death (samsara) as infinite finitude.7 Seen from 
the standpoint of so-called samsara-riw-nirvana, this infinite finitude is 
not aloof from the home-ground of existence in the form of the falling 
away of body and mind. For this ec-sistence keeps itself aloof from samsara 
right in the midst of samsaric existence. It holds itself aloof from birth­
death, because at any time it stands steadfast on the “beginning” whence 
that time comes into its own: on the beginning of Time itself.
1 Ibid., p. 44 ff.
8 IW , P 59-
• Shbbogmzo Bendoioa (translation in E.B. vi, i); see also E.B. tx, 1, p. 6$ ff.
In reference to the opening phrase of the Heart Sutra: “At the time 
when Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva engaged in the practice of the deep 
Prajndparamita," I have said that this “practice” and this “time” are 
matters of this ec-sistence.8 *
This ec-sistence is the ec-sistence of the “self” in the sense that all 
things come forward and. make one’s self the way of their practice and 
confirmation; or, in other words, the ec-sistence of the self which lives in 
the world as Time from the very beginning where Time comes to a head 
and the world “worlds.” Ec-sistence in this sense is not something different 
from its essential “time.”
It is the same with “practice.” I quoted DSgen’s saying about the 
dropping off body-mind being sanzen. The home-ground of the ec- 
sistence of body-mind dropping off is the place where the world worlds; 
that is, where all “things” are gathered together in their suchness or in 
their being as they really are, and realizing thus their dharmic nature.That 
is the place where the self is “confirmed by all dharmas” (i.e., all things), 
and also the place where, as D6gen says,*  the Buddhas and patriarchs are 
holding together that practice based on proper sitting in self-joyous 
samadhi. Well-known also is Dogen’s “To learn the Buddha’s Way is 
to learn oneself. To learn oneself is to forget oneself. To forget oneself 
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means to be confirmed by all dharmas. To be confirmed by all dharmas 
means to let the body-mind of oneself and the self of others drop off” 
(ton/dtozn).10 The ‘‘dropping off of body-mind” spoken of here and the 
‘‘dropped-off body-mind” are none other than sanzen.
10 Translation in E.B. v, 2, p. 129 ff
11 See E.B. ix, 1, p. 63.
12 Ibid., p. 65.
12 Ibid., p. 62.
14 Ddgen, FuJumzazzngi (translation in E.B. vi, 2).
That one’s self is given attestation by all dharmas and that in such a 
way the world “worlds,” is precisely what was called “crosslegging the 
King Samadhi.”11 Here all things come forward to practice and affirm 
one’s self. This being so, the practice of deep prajndpframita spoken of 
in the Heart Sutra can only mean the ec-sistence of body-mind dropped off 
in the sense described above.
As stated in the previous section,12 *14this ec-sistence of die fallen away 
body and mind is said to denote “the solitary One, alone and unbared 
in the myriad phenomena of the world.” I also said that this is the 
“truth” (Alitheia) of that ec-sistence revealing itself absolutely unbared. 
In bearing witness to this “solitary One alone and unbared,” each and 
every phenomenon is more intrinsically that “thing” itself than it is in 
itself. We can say that in the very Beginning in which the world worlds, 
the world is more truly itself than it is in the world itself. That all dharmas 
(i.e., all things) come forward, practice oneself, and bear witness to 
oneself means that all dharmas come back to the place they can be more 
intrinsically “true” than they are in and by themselves; to the absolute 
Truth, to That which in its unbared grandeur reveals itself solitary amidst 
the myriad things.
Seen from there, what is described as a process of all things coming 
forward and bearing witness to one’s self is not a different matter from 
the idea that the dropping off of body-mind is sanzen. Or again, it w'as 
said that the dropping off of body-mind means one’s original face coming 
to present itself (Fukanzazengi} This original countenance presents itself 
at the place where the world “worlds”; the place where one’s treasure- 
house opens of itself and one uses it at will;1* the place of “the self- 
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joyous samadhi.’* This is none other than the place the Buddhas and 
patriarchs practice zazen. On the whole, this is the meaning contained 
in what is called “practice.”
Hakuin (1685-1768) has a Zen comment (jakugoY*  on the occurrence 
of the word “practice” in the Heart Suira. He says: what about the phe­
nomena of man moving his hands and feet, eating or drinking, of the clouds 
moving, the rivers flowing, the leaves falling and the blossoms scattering? 
As soon as one tries to affix any kind of form, however slight, to them and 
give them some definite countenance, the same result is bound to follow 
as in Chuang-tzu’s fable about Chaos: when someone gouged out Chaos 
and attached an eyeball to it, Chaos died. What Hakuin says is only 
natural, if one recalls that “practice” means the aforesaid samadhi of 
self-enjoyment which always manifests the character of perfect round 
wholeness and is always absolutely free. There is nothing here which is 
not in one’s own treasure-house and which is not available to be used as 
one pleases. We should avoid inflicting a wound on this harmoniously 
blended whole by letting an act of discriminative thought intervene, 
putting an eyeball on it As soon as the attitude of objective representa­
tion enters there with the “form” of what is outside oneself, a look or 
feature as the “other” will arise; something that is not one’s own treasure 
and is not available for use at will, will arrive on the scene. “Chaos” will 
die. This already marks a deviation from the place of “practice.”
The moment you see “practice” in a representative fashion, you have 
already attached to the form. On the field where practice is truly practice, 
phenomena such as man moving his limbs, clouds moving across the sky, 
water flowing, leaves falling, and blossoms scattering, are formless. Their 
form is a formless one. And to adopt this “formless form” as one’s own 
form—is none other than the standpoint of “practice.”
With regard to the term “deep-paramita,” Hakuin again remarks that 
it is “Gouging out perfectly good flesh to make a wound.” And regarding 
the word “time,” he likewise says, “There again the good flesh is gouged 
out.” His meaning is the same as before. He wants to say that when one
15 Pithy comment*  “attached” {jaku} to the utterances of Zen masters or pasages 
from sutras which express in a free manner one’s own appreciative interpretation.
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deliberately speaks of prajni” and “time,” imagining such things 
actually exist somewhere one is only damaging perfectly good flesh. In 
the ec-sistence of the fallen-away body-mind, prajna and time must 
both be formless. They are the formless form of that ec-sistence.
In the foregoing, I dealt with birth-death (samsara) on the field of 
samsara-swe-nirvana as the problem of “time.” My interpretation was 
concentrated on the temporality of ec-sistence as sunyata or “emp­
tiness” in the true sense, and a term of Ddgen’s, “dropped-off body and 
mind,” was chosen as an instance of the same ec-static existence as 
sunyata. This ec-sistence is a position where all things in the world are 
gathered together: all things which come to appear in this world of inces­
sant becoming and transition without fail in their dharmic nature 
and always in their real suchness. This being so, when one’s self as body­
mind is bom, “the birth is, as such, no-birth,” and when it perishes, “the 
perishing is, as such, no-perishing.” Ec-sistence as sunyata in the King 
Samadhi holds all “things” or “phenomena” through its own Law or 
Dharma and uses them in self-enjoyment. Its standpoint is always absolute 
freedom in the midst of this world of incessant becoming and transition. 
It is not different from Time coming to a head from all possible times 
before, not different from the “Beginning” of time itself.
It may be said, however, that a question still remains unsolved. It is the 
question of how on the basis of this “time” could what we usually call 
“history” ever be explained. The problem concerns the historicity of 
“time.” No matter how the standpoint of the dropped-off body-mind may 
be evaluated, human history is a world of men whose body-mind has not 
fallen away and who are wandering al! the time in illusion, ignorant 
of the right way. Though man may be saved through religion, is that not 
only a concern of the individual ? We must conclude that human societies 
in history go their own way regardless of whether individuals arc saved 
or not. Especially the Buddhist idea of “emptiness,” is it not super- 
historical and hence non-historical ? We know indeed the general con­
ception of Buddhism tends to affirm this question. It is an incontrovertible 
fact that a consciousness of history in the sense it now seems to have taken 
has scarcely developed from within Buddhism. It would be quite natural 
to expect during the long development of Mahayana Buddhism that the
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problem of history would have been called in question from the standpoint 
of samsara-rutf-nirvana, especially in the discussion about Bodhisattva­
hood. But this expectation was not to be fulfilled. What was the reason 
for that? It is surely an issue of importance for us today to return to the 
past to study the causes for this. But here I cannot embark upon such a 
task. I will instead take up another problem; namely, the question of 
whether the several basic viewpoints of history which have to the present 
appeared on the scene in the West do, in fact, exhaust all possible ways 
of viewing history, or whether the aforesaid standpoint of “emptiness” 
can contribute anything new.
VI
In An Historian's Approach to Religion (1956), Arnold Toynbee argues 
that in the present age, the greatest cultural gulf is not between liberalism 
and communism, for although the opposition between them is highly 
conspicuous today, we cannot see it as a factor that will fundamentally 
determine the future course of mankind. When we examine their origins, 
we find both of them to belong to the same group of ideologies and re­
ligions of Western Judaic origin. (Here the Western Judaic group of 
ideologies and religions is used in a broad sense that includes Christianity, 
Islam, and Judaism.) On the contrary, the confrontation which is deep 
enough to determine the problems of the whole of mankind consists, 
according to Toynbee, in the chasm between the Buddhaic group of 
philosophies and religions and the Western Judaic group. (Here “Bud- 
dhaic” thought is understood to contain also the pre-Buddhaic Indian 
philosophy and post-Buddhaic Hinduism, not to mention the Mahayana 
and the Hinayana.) The chasm between these two ways of thought forms 
the basis of all economic and cultural opposition. Although it is not so im­
mediately conspicuous as the opposition between communism and 
liberalism, Toynbee asserts that as a problem concerning the future of all 
mankind, it is more serious and important, the authentic problem of the 
future history of the world.
In Toynbee’s opinion, the Buddhaic philosophies have the following 
characteristic features. First, the motions of nature and the cosmos are 
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thought to be cyclic. Second, that which governs the cosmos and the 
human world is conceived as an impersonal law (dharma). These view­
points, he says, determine the views of Nature and History of the Buddhaic 
philosophies. On the other hand, according to the view of history of West­
ern Judaic thought historical time flow's as a non-recurring process, and 
the whole process is governed by a personal Being. History is basically 
characterized as something that can be controlled and determined by the 
power of intellect and will and can be imputed a meaning through that 
power.
Now, to that way of “Buddhaic” thinking can be ascribed one advan­
tage over the Western way of thinking: it contains the possibility of 
transcending the self-ccntcrcdncss which is innate not only in man but 
generally in all living creatures. To think that the rhythmic movement of 
the cosmos is cyclic or that the cosmos and the human world are under the 
rule of impersonal law is to place emphasis upon the universal rather than 
on the particular of everything and to see things from their aspect of uni­
versality. Toynbee interprets this as a view in which the individual in one 
way or another is dissolved into the universal; a view w’hich has a signi­
ficance of its own so far as the self-centeredness is thus transcended, but 
through which History is instead completely deprived of its significance. 
For, in a world where everything is reduced to the idea of the universal, 
nothing essentially new can take place. Seen fundamentally, there remains 
only a mere repetition of the same, a sort of circular movement in which 
same universal entities obtain.
On the contrary, in the Western Judaic way of thinking, the history of 
the world of man is considered to be similar to the rhythmic procession 
of an individual human life. Just like a drama, it has a beginning, and, 
developing along a definite plot, it reaches an end. While various 
vicissitudes and dramatic crises appear on the scene between the 
beginning and the end, somewhere the plot comes to an eventual close.
When history is conceived of as such a drama or individual life-career, 
the controlling factor is the will. When God is thought of in this 
connection, it is the will of a personal God that holds sway over the entire 
history. And every individual person acting in the world-drama is per­
forming also with his human faculties which again is motivated basically 
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by the will of his personal self. Here, History is set up as something that 
involves “meaning” within itself.
But on the other hand, in this standpoint, man’s sclf-centeredness never 
ceases to project its shadow, however far one may succeed in leaving it 
behind. A remarkable example of this can be found in the fact that the 
religion of Israel is connected with a consciousness of the Jewish people 
as God’s chosen people. It is true that, in the religion of Israel, the ego- 
centred attitude of man, his self-centredness before God, is something that 
must be denied as sin. But those who, before God, throw away this self- 
centeredness, obey Him wholeheartedly and follow His will obediently, 
come to regain their consciousness of being the chosen people in relation 
to others. Self-centercdness appears once more on a higher level: the 
will of the self backed up by the will of God. Even though such a position 
of the will made it possible for the first time to furnish world-history with 
meaning, it left the self-centeredness intact to the very end.
This, roughly represented, is Toynbee’s thesis. It also seems to con­
tain a ready sign-post pointing to where the final problematic lies in 
regard to the way of viewing history.
“History” is essentially connected with the fact that a self which is here 
described as self-centered comes to operate from within itself in the form of 
personality (whatever explanation may be given to this concept) in con­
trast to the world of “nature,” about which this cannot be said. If that be 
true, what kind of significance docs history come to possess when seen 
in its connection with religion?
We have just said that man’s sclf-centeredness always remains in the 
Western religions; even when it is once negated, it appears again, as in the 
guise of a chosen people. One may suspect there lies hidden in the back­
ground of that concept a sort of direct projection onto God of the Jewish 
people’s desire that He shoud be wrathful for passing judgment on other 
peoples. Perhaps an unconscious desire to punish others was projected 
onto their righteous God. Roughly speaking, an emotional attitude of 
this kind (the so-called ressentiment) can reappear in a higher form of self- 
centredness by passing through God to the level of religion. The consum­
mate self-abandonment or whole-hearted humility (the so-called Demul) 
towards God turns out to become the basis of the superiority complex of 
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the self over and against others; and that only prereflectively and pur­
poselessly, as a depth-psychological move, so to speak. Be that as it may, 
we cannot but feel that, in spite of the religious self-negation of one’s 
own self-centeredness, the deep roots of the latter still remain firmly 
entrenched, and from there an unconscious reaction arises, with the result 
that this self-negation reverses of itself into an unconsciously disguised 
self-centeredness. And this is just the point that has been disclosed and 
attacked by modem critics of Christianity, most radically perhaps by 
philosophers such as Feuerbach and Nietzsche.
For the state in which the possibility of such a reaction or reversal to 
be left unchallenged, with the root of self-centeredness intact as an 
“unconscious” force, means that here the self-reflection which belongs to 
the quintessence of man’s self is still not yet pushed to its extreme. It 
stands short of full achievement, incapable of penetrating down to the 
self’s own marrow. To use Buddhist terminology, the self still leaves the 
basic auidyi (ignorance) intact in itself as its own root. If, therefore, it be 
true that history can be endowed with meaning only on the basis of 
man’s being a self or so-called “subjectivity” which even when equipped 
with the high-sounding name of “personality” cannot fail to imply the 
character of self-centeredness, then it will also mean that history is in 
essence the world of beings involving the basic avidyd and hence involved 
in the field of karma and hereditary former karma (/rUrva-karman). It 
is also clear that history is invariably showing us such an aspect.
On the other hand, however, it is generally held that historicity tends 
to weaken in the direction of a radicalized negation of self-centeredness, 
through the process of the dissolution of the individual and personal into 
the universal and impersonal. This has been the conventional view for a 
long time in the West. As we have seen above, an eminent contemporary 
historian like Toynbee is of this opinion. If it is true, we are forced into 
admitting that a kind of dilemma lies hidden between religion and 
history. But is this really so?
First, I must point out that in the position of Toynbee expounded above 
his interpretation of Buddhism, and of Mahayana Buddhism in particular, 
seems to be questionable in some respects. He seems to assume that, in the 
Mahayanic conception also, “time” is simply circular and all things are 
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dominated by impersonal law, the result of this being an ambiguity 
of the meaning of history or a lack of historical consciousness. If we 
judge it from the Western idea of history, his opinion may seem to be 
valid; in fact, however, the question is not so simple as that. It is here 
rather that we discern the final problem to be solved.
As regards its so-called ‘‘circularity,” all religions which can be char­
acterized in terms of mythos share in common the view that time is recur­
rent and non-historical. Even in philosophy, that is, the philosophy whose 
essential feature lies in breaking free of the mythological way of living and 
viewing things—as we have already seen, the ancient Greek philosophies, 
for example, can be characterized in this way—there are many cases in 
which time is regarded as circular.
This concept of time is inevitable, when one sees the universe or all 
things in the universe from the point of view of nature. In the world of 
nature, the four seasons follow rotation and the various periods recur 
in the passage of years and months. The “time” of natural phenomena, 
including astronomical time, returns necessarily to its starting point and 
repeatedly follows the same orbit.
From the point of view of its content, human life is likewise molded 
by rotating time. To cite only one instance, in ancient Japan at the 
time of the rice crop new wine made from harvest rice would be offered 
in the royal palace to the gods and deities. Then the emperor and his 
subjects would drink it together in celebration. In ancient times this 
ceremony is said to have taken place every year. Probably it was per­
formed on the strength of a belief that this wine was possessed of a manna­
like vitality. When a man drank wine made from new rice, the “spiritual” 
power inherent in rice gave security to his life and certainty to his existence 
anew. Rice is connected also with the generative power contained in the 
soil of the country. Through the rice this power works as a force in support 
of man’s existence. Through the ceremony in which the emperor and 
his subjects drink the same wine, their political connection and the 
relations constitutive of the state are renewed.
Moreover, these acts are performed on the basis of the relation 
between the kami and men. In other words, the relations between the gods 
and man, the gods and the land, man and the land, and man and man, 
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constitute as one totality a communal and politically unified relationship, 
and this whole connection is renewed once every year. For this purpose, 
a yearly festival is held at a definite time. Otherwise, life in the fol­
lowing year could not proceed on a firm basis. By its observance, a year 
of life, man’s year-round existence, the existence of the state and the com­
munal political relations, the rice production, economic life and so on, 
are guaranteed anew and regenerated until the same season arrives 
again. Since everything becomes antiquated after the elapse of a year, it 
must be regenerated anew at the end of each yearly cycle. That unified 
relationship must be reconstructed and re-established by equal participa­
tion in the same “spiritual” vitality offered in the festival. That is what is 
meant by saying life is cyclic.
Here, the chief characteristic of history in its authentic sense docs 
not come out clearly. The natural world and the human world move 
pari passu in accordance with a definite “rule.” The human life in its 
various phases has its own “usage” and runs according to its norms. The 
usage which has a religious basis and enters into everyday life has been 
operating this way from the beginning of history, that is, in this case, from 
the outset of the establishment of the state. In other words, history is 
accounted for only in the form of a repetition of something recurrent. 
Every deviation from this orbit is condemned as sin or defilement. Evil 
or sin in the ethico-religious sense consists in going astray from the norm 
of life, that is, from the modal pattern which has been observed repeatedly 
from the beginning of history. In short, all religions which are based upon 
myth reveal a standpoint like this. At the same time, I think it noteworthy 
that in the Japanese myth concerning the establishment of the nation, the 
origin of the country is conceived of as dating from the once-happened, 
non-recurring event of the descent to earth of the heavenly grandson of 
the Sun-goddess.
The fact that the historical consciousness originated in the Jewish 
people involves in many respects a problem. Historical consciousness 
since then underwent remarkable development in the West and, in 
the modern age in particular, it has gradually come to pass that the 
whole of human life itself is reconstituted through man’s own historical 
consciousness about himself. What is included in such a development?
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No doubt, in Christianity too, as in ancient Japan, righteousness 
was regarded to consist only in living in obedience to the law ordained by 
God. But here, man in history is from the start conceived of as having 
rebelled against God’s will and having broken the divine order, so that sin 
constitutes the most essential factor in the Christian view of man in 
history. In the concept of original sin, man’s consciousness of sin, that is, 
of his separation from God, is intimately connected with the consciousness 
of his existence as an autonomous, independent being. And conversely, in 
man’s subjective self-awareness of existence is always recognized the 
implication of his consciousness of sin.
And with this, it can be said, the consciousness of liberty which did 
not come into play in the standpoint of cyclic recurrence found in mytho­
logical religions has, in Christianity, come to arise at one with man’s 
self-awareness as an individual being. We can also say that only here 
has “time” ceased to be recurrent, so that every step of man’s life has 
become dramatic and every moment of time has become something 
creative out of which new things may emerge.
In short, man’s awareness of his own being in terms of the “self” is here 
established in connection with three factors: the awareness of original 
sin, of liberty, and of the oncc-for-all nature (Einmaligkcit) of time. Here, 
the consciousness of history is connected with man’s self-awareness that 
implies an essential tendency toward self-ccntcredness. And since salvation 
consists in the historic event in which this self-centered mode of being 
based upon original sin is overcome and a reconciliation with God is 
brought about, religion is constituted, here, of three basic factors: aware­
ness of sin which forms its ground, man’s freedom, and historicity. This 
kind of religion stands on a plane much higher than the mythological one.
Thus, when we pursue the problem of history, we inevitably strike 
against the emergence of such a standpoint of man’s self-awareness with 
which, moreover, the problems of sin, freedom, and the historicity of “time” 
are connected. This standpoint can be said to have been maintained 
throughout Christianity and its forerunner, the religion of the Hebrew 
prophets.
The next question concerns the kind of problematic involved in the 
above-stated case of Christianity. Here I cannot enter into a detailed 
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consideration of this question. I can only touch upon it to the extent it 
has reference to the present concern: the problem of historicity versus 
“emptiness.” In that context, I think that the problematic involved in 
Christianity is connected with the three factors I cited above as implied 
in the Christian self-awareness of man’s existence: the awareness of sin, 
freedom, and the once-for-all nature of time.
The first question concerns the self-centered character which appears 
within the self-awareness of religious man. As we have seen above, 
in Christianity, where the origin of history is supposed to imply sin, the 
very beginning and development of history on the one hand and man’s 
self-centered being on the other are conceived of as essentially united. 
(In this sense, Kant, for example, once said that evil was supposedly the 
origin of history.) Further, the conquest of man’s self-centeredness, that is, 
his salvation accomplished through the atonement of original sin and 
reconciliation with God, is also assumed to be a historical event within 
history, prepared through the development of history after God’s plan. 
The incarnation of the Son of God in Jesus Christ and the atonement by 
his death on the cross are regarded as having opened up in history the 
field of man’s salvation, that is, to have revealed God’s agape into history, 
special emphasis being here placed upon their historical facticity. God’s 
agape is revealed into history. It comes from God’s side toward the self- 
centred human being which exists in history, bearing the burden of original 
sin. Also, repentance and faith on the side of man are related to this 
historical revelation, that is, to Jesus Christ as an actual historical entity.
Now, the religious standpoint which is thus established has a character 
of exclusive absoluteness that leaves no room for any commensurability 
with other religions. For the facticity of history is, in general, absolutely 
incommensurable in that it is a factum or actual reality, and moreover, 
specifically in this case, the object of religious belief is a factum whose 
historicity is particularly emphasized. In such a circumstance, the 
requisition of the absoluteness a religious “truth” generally postulates com­
bines with the once-ness of a historical fact. As a result, the standpoint 
of this faith has no other choice but to ask for itself exclusive absoluteness. 
Here intolerance inevitably raises its head. Like the consciousness of being 
a chosen people which appeared in the religion of Israel, this is self- 
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centeredness in the realm of religion. This is precisely what Toynbee dealt 
with in his book.
Intolerance here is essentially related to the fact that this belief is based 
upon a personal standpoint, the standpoint of a personal relationship 
with a personal God; for religious personality also involves within itself 
a sort of self-centeredness. Because of this self-centered ness, the faith of 
Christianity could not avoid giving rise to frequent struggles between this 
factor and the other ingredient of agape, that is, the love of one’s fellow­
men. The struggles against the pagan unbelievers at the end of ancient 
times, in the Middle Ages (the Crusades, for instance), and throughout 
the modem age, the persecution of heretics, the Inquisition, the religious 
wars within the Christian world—these and the intolerance they reveal, 
together with the similar phenomena in Islam, arc negligible in the 
history of Buddhism.
The second problem in connection with the Christian view of history 
is its eschatology. Mythological religions not infrequently have an escha­
tology of cyclical world-time according to which, at the end of a periodical 
cycle, the world is destroyed in conflagration, and a new world arises 
from the ashes. We can also find in Buddhism the fourfold notion of 
the coming into being, existence, destruction, and emptiness of the 
world. There is no such cylic character in Christian eschatology. But 
here, as is well-known, the coming of the uchaion which will appear 
suddenly from God at some least-expected time and bring world-history 
to a close, is considered in connection with the notions of the second 
coming of Christ and the final judgment.
Now, I think that this notion of the end of history is problematic 
insofar as it is, as Christianity demands, conceived of as historical fact 
which is expected to take place in the actual historical world. The 
emergence of the super-historical which brings all history to a close is 
represented here as an event that happens only once, that is, in the 
dimension of historical fact. This view, I think, is open to doubt. The 
history of Europe records many cases in which people who took the 
eschaton for a literally historical fact fell into panic thinking that the end 
of the world was at hand. Today, it is no longer possible to take seriously 
the notion that an end to history emerges historically in the dimension
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of historical fact with historical meaning.
Contemporary theology attaches much importance to eschatology. 
It may be possible to give the eschaton idea a new meaning; for instance, 
through the so-called existential interpretation. But even in this case, it 
would still be difficult to imagine the eschaton in the world of historical 
fact.
In short, the awareness of the once-ness and historicity of “time” was 
established in Christianity, and the cyclical character of “time” inherent 
in the mythological religions was overcome. And at the same time, the 
eschatology of cyclical world-time in mythological religion was con­
verted into a historical one. The ocAofon now came to be considered as 
an end which cuts short the whole of the past history of mankind and 
brings it to a close even on the level of historical fact; as an end which is a 
one-time historical event. The whole past history, then, could be called 
the “pre-history” of mankind, even by modem figures like Marx or 
Nietzsche, or called “interim” time by Christian theologians.
Although I admit that the establishment of historical consciousness 
was an epoch-making event, I think this consciousness is still problematic 
in the respect that it came about only in correlation with such a form of 
eschatology, in such a conception of the end of history. This whole 
circumstance is also basically connected with the Christian viewpoint 
which sees the origin of history in original sin. Later on, I will deal with 
this in detail.
Since the modern consciousness of history was established and the 
study of history as a “science” came into existence, eschatology has almost 
ceased to figure in the view of history of those who make historical (act 
the object of their study. On the level of the immanent view of historical 
fact it is impossible indeed to consider an end coming from outside of 
history itself. On this level, it is of course quite natural to reckon 
with a direction oriented to some aim immanent in history. But such a 
direction has no final end in itself. One of the most naive expressions of 
this can be found in the idea of “progress” characteristic of the 18th 
century school of “enlightenment.”
The idealistic notion of mankind endlessly advancing in history stands 
diametrically opposed to the eschatological view of history. But even this 
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one-sided view of history contains in it an unquestionable component of 
historical consciousness. In history there is certainly an aspect of progress. 
The historical world shows us a face that refuses the notion of eschaion 
in which everything is subjected to divine judgment; an aspect of continu­
ous progress through the unfolding of ever new developments. Even 
today, those who rely upon the notion of “progress” stand basically upon 
a view of history of this kind.
Notice must be made, however, that in its origin this view of history 
came into existence as a repulsion against the intolerance of the Christian 
type of faith. The basis of this view of history is trust in human reason. 
The first impulse toward this emphasis upon reason originated, in the 
midst of the bloody struggles within the Christian world, in the will 
to find a common standpoint apart from all dogmatic faith. Hence this 
rational standpoint was, in principle, bom of the impulse of a spirit of 
tolerance.
It led, on the one hand, to the so-called deistic attempt to reinterpret 
the Christian doctrines on a standpoint of reasonableness and then 
developed later into the standpoints of “philosophy” of religion and 
‘ ‘science” of religion, the latter wi th i ts ramification into various fields of psy­
chology, sociology, anthropology, and history (“history of religions”) etc., 
in all of which an attitude of religious tolerance constitutes the dominant 
factor. On the other hand, the rational tendency developed into the 
scientific view of history and of society, where in the main an attitude of 
critical opposition to religion holds sway. The view of history as “progress” 
stands generally in the latter direction.
What I have mentioned on this point has a bearing on a third prob­
lematic; that in man's subjective self-awareness is involved another facet 
which cannot be exhausted merely by reference to original sin. In other 
words, in this self-awareness is involved essentially the standpoint of 
“reason” and the demand of rationality in the realms of knowledge and 
practice. Further, fundamentally seen, this rational standpoint can be 
reduced to man’s freedom as a rational being. Man’s freedom contains 
in its roots not only the aspect of sin in man’s relation to God but also 
another aspect which can be regarded as reason in man’s relation to him­
self. And here lurks inevitably the simultaneous conflict between fides and 
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ratio, and between intolerance and tolerance—conflicts which have never 
been absent throughout the whole history of Christianity.
Of course, it is impossible to view history only as “progress” made 
possible by bringing human reason to ‘‘enlightenment.“ It is meaningful, 
for example, that a contemporary historian like Butterfield16 takes up 
the notion of “judgment” not as a dogma of faith but as a category 
through which to elucidate history. More than that, the emergence of 
a view such as Nietzsche’s nihilism which contends that “God is dead,” 
that the Christian notions of eschatology and God’s judgment have lost 
their power to impart direction to the human spirit, signifies at the 
same time a critique turned toward the “God-killer,” the superficially 
optimistic rationalism with its optimistic idea of progress. Nietzsche’s 
nihilism was a double-edged sword of radical skepticism against those 
two conflicting thoughts.
Hubert Butterfield, Christianity and History (>949)*
At any rate, the idea of progress today ceases to be the lone dominating 
category through which to investigate history. But even so, the problem­
atic of the modern historic consciousness which is taking shape around 
the idea of progress can hardly be solved solely by returning to the old 
eschatological view of history.
In the foregoing, I have tried to trace the kind of problems involved in 
the circumstance that, in the “Judaic Western” group of religions 
(Toynbee’s phrase), especially in Christianity, man’s subjective conscious­
ness of being a “self,” on the one hand, and the “historicity” of history in 
the double sense of historical consciousness as well as of history itself be­
coming conscious of its own, on the other, have simultaneously come into 
existence. The three problematics mentioned above are basically combined 
into one; and from this basis, if we go further back, we are led to the notion 
of God’s personality and, hence, man’s personality. I will not enter into 
a discussion of these here. I have already dealt with them once and will 
again later on.
I have discussed the problems dealt with here from a slightly different 
angle in an article entitled “Religion, History, and Culture” in my book 
(written in Japanese) “The Philosophy of Fundamental Subjectivity” (1940), 
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and in "Religion and Culture" in my book (also in Japanese) entitled 
" Religion and the Problems of Contemporary Society" (1951).
VII
Although the views of history in Christianity and in the modem move­
ment of rationalistic "enlightenment" stand diametrically opposed, they 
have something in common in that both of them recognize a meaning in 
history. The former recognizes God’s providence or administration in 
history from the standpoint of its theocentric faith, and the latter sets up 
from the anthropocentric standpoint of man’s reason the telos of history 
in the consummate rationalization of human life.
In opposition to them, the world-view of modem nihilism goes back 
to an abysmal nihilum in which not only history but also all other pro­
cesses of the world are finally reduced to meaninglessness. I have said 
above that this abysmal situation means an ec-stadc transcendence of 
man’s being-in-the-world and gives expression to the self-awareness of 
man’s existence in its limit-situation. On the basis of this nihilism, Nietz­
sche made a turnabout to the idea of eternal return, under the disguise 
of which the “will to power’’ manifests itself. Now, the eternal return of 
the world propounded by him cannot simply be said to be non-historical, 
like the cyclic rotation of the natural world-process in mythological reli­
gions, for the eternal return here is reckoned as implying all the processes 
that can be regarded as new creations in history. As a matter of fact, the 
nihilistic world-view itself was bom from the depths of the development 
of history in the West as a kind of uncompromising self-reflection. Its 
very emergence was a historical event. The philosophy of the “will to 
power,’’ a turnabout from nihilism, is also essentially connected with 
the problem of history.
Be that as it may, insofar as the will to power consists, in the final 
analysis, in a world-view of eternal repetition, I think that on that eternal 
repetition which is the final ground of history and a sphere of ec-static 
transcendence, the meaning of history cannot find its foundation except 
in a negative fashion. We must not overlook, though, the positive side 
in Nietzsche’s thought. In the perspective inherent in the position of 
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the will to power, all the meanings which hitherto had been attributed 
to history and turned into meaninglessness in nihilum could be again 
provisorily affirmed in their provisory values and be restored to their 
relative import when all the “world-interpretations” until now came to be 
affirmed from the position of the will of power as so many tentative attempts 
of that will to posit values.
The ideas of the will to power and eternal return, which represent a 
position of great affirmation, could only appear after a great nihilistic 
negation. All of the meanings which were imparted to history and are now 
rendered meaningless—inclusive even of the meanings which human 
reason gives to history in making itself the principle of meaningfulness— 
are restored once more by the position of the will to power in the sphere 
of its own ec-static transcendence and are transformed into the will’s 
own perspective.
However, if the will to power as the ec-static basis on which all those 
meanings are restored only succeeds in opening up the field of eternal 
return of the same world-time, history is, after all, only restored in such a 
fashion that it cannot complete its true historicity. So long as the view 
that something absolutely new is created in “time” cannot be radically 
carried through, history is always deprived of its true meaning.
In this respect, Nietzsche’s view of eternal return is pregnant with a 
problematic that is exactly the opposite of that of Christian eschatology.
As we have seen, Christianity broke down the cyclic character of 
mythological “time” and imparted historicity to “time.” But at the same 
time, it also supplied the mythological end of time (eschaton) with histo­
ricity. As a result, the eschaion was expected to descend from a trans-histori- 
cal dimension and appear in the level of history as the one-time historical 
event of the second advent of Christ and the last judgment: an historical 
event supposed to bring all history to a close. Thus, the historicity of 
history could be brought to its complete realization through and with 
the historicity of eschatology, in such a way, however, as puts a final 
stop to actual history itself. A stop of this sort cannot be found in Nietz­
sche’s view of eternal return. Actual history here proceeds to an aim 
immanent in it, the aim of the “superman” in the present outlook, for 
“man” is something that shall be overcome. But, while history is exempt 
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from being predestined to an abrupt end by possessing the eternal return 
as its cc-static (and, in this sense, “super-historical”) ultimate base, the 
endlessness thus guaranteed is obtained only in such a way that history 
comes up short of full historicity.
Therefore, the final question to be solved here is: How is it possible for 
"history” to carry its historicity to the ultimate super-historical base 
without thereby being brought to a full stop through the super-historical? 
Or rather: Is there any possibility that "history” can become historical 
in the consummate sense of the word precisely by its historicity being 
carried unto its super-historical ground? I think this question inevitably 
leads to the relationship between history and "emptiness.”
The problem of eschatology has nothing to do with the end of history 
in the sense, for example, that the earth might cool off and mankind 
thereby become extinct. It is rather concerned with the question of a super- 
historical level which is disclosed through man’s self-awareness of his 
own existence in history. Ultimately, it is the problem of the end of history 
in a religious sense. Particularly in Christianity it is maintained that 
the way of man’s salvation was bestowed as the historical event of Christ’s 
incarnation; a way cut open from the super-historical level into history’ 
itself. The incarnation is the beginning of the eschaton, so to speak, which 
will be brought to completion through the future historical event of the 
second advent of Christ.
Now, the notion of the end of history corresponds with that of the begin­
ning of history. The idea that history has a finish correlates to the idea 
that it has a start. This start is represented by the fall of Adam. The 
incarnation of Christ took place in order to bestow salvation upon man 
living within the original sin through Adam’s fall, that is, in order to put 
an end to the history which had begun with Adam. History starts with 
Adam’s sin and ends in the second advent of Christ. Or again, it begins 
with God’s punishment and ends in the last judgment. As Adam’s fall, 
the incarnation of Christ, and his second advent arc one-time historical 
events, at least insofar as they are seen from the inside of history, religion 
here is essentially based upon history and history essentially based upon 
religion. The history of salvation or the history of judgment is, as such, 
the religion itself.
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As we have seen, however, the historical consciousness in modern times 
became totally estranged from the view that history is predestined to a 
historical end. Consequently in the modem world, eschatology falls back 
into a level similar to the notion of the world-end of mythological reli­
gions. A retrogress is made to the level on which people conceive, for 
example, of the cooling off of the earth as a fate meted out by the “will” 
of Nature, or find Divine “punishment” in some catstrophic phenomena 
of nature such as a great deluge or violent earthquake. But an tschalon 
of this sort can no longer have any relevancy to the principle problem 
in the making of man’s view of history. As we have already suggested, 
there is in history an intrinsic aspect that rejects it, the aspect of “reason” 
on which the modem historical consciousness, as is expressed in the 
establishment of the study of history as “science,” unfolds itself.
The same thing can be said of the beginning of history no less than of 
its end. In the contemporary world, I think, hardly anyone believes 
literally that the history of mankind began with Adam’s fall.
That history has a beginning and an end should be entirely denied from 
the immanent way of viewing history. And this immanent view, the view 
which developed into the science of history, is essential to history and 
indispensable for historical consciousness as well as for man’s view of 
history, to the same degree as the super-historical view which develops 
into the religious understanding of history. The notions of the beginning 
of history and its end as they appear in the long tradition of Christianity 
must be said to be incompatible with this point of view and, so far, contain 
a problem still waiting for solution. The problem lies in the way of under­
standing the meaning of those notions, in the way of interpretation, 
which, in traditional Christianity, still remains confined within the frame 
of the old mythology.
If so, where can wc find the root of the problem ? In answer to this ques­
tion, we cannot but say that it lies in the view of God, according to which 
God is conceived of as a “personal” being, a being provided with a self- 
conscious “will.” History has a beginning and an end as God’s punishment 
and judgment. History is interpreted as the history of judgment, or the 
history of salvation by God. Behind history, there is a God who governs 
the world with his will and intellect, or with his good will and wise provi­
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dence. It is only through God’s will that history took its departure and 
will be brought to a close, these events being sheer manifestations of the 
divine will. Here, the view that history has a beginning and an end is 
essentially connected with the fact that God is conceived of on a super- 
historical level as a personal, that is, self-centered (“theo-centric”) willful 
being; in the final analysis, as some “being,” as “something or some 
entity that ir.”
No one can deny that the notion of a personal God, a God of judgment 
(or of justice), or a God of love, by causing human beings to stand face to 
face with the “sacred” in the form of a living subject, face to face with a 
God who is probably beyond compare in the sacredness of his majesty 
and grace, has brought man’s conscience and love to special depth and 
thus has elevated the human personality to a remarkable height. Because 
of this, and provided that the above analysis of the inherent problematic 
is right, it would be all the more desirable that the solution of these prob­
lems would arise from within Christianity itself in the future. I think we 
are in need of this solution not only for the purpose of constructing a true 
view of history for future mankind but also in order that Christianity 
itself may successfully confront the “secularized” view of history in the 
modern world.
With regard to Nietzsche’s so-called eternal return, we can say that 
so far as the term “eternal” is concerned there is neither beginning nor 
end, and that so far as the term “return” is concerned the same beginning 
and the same end always repeat themselves. These two are here one and 
the same.
This boundless meaninglessness, watched over by a nihilistic air, is 
overcome by a turnabout in which the standpoint of the Will to power 
opens up through this meaninglessness and the world becomes a mani­
festation of this Will. In this standpoint, all the world-processes are 
penetrated by a “Will to will” which “plays” itself away on the field of the 
fresh purity of the “Innocence of Becoming” (Unshuld du Werdtns) in 
perfect abandon and high spirits. This standpoint may perhaps be called 
a “voluntaristically” modernized version of Heraclitus. It can possibly 
be recognized also as one of the Western thoughts which have come nearest 
to the Buddhist standpoint of emptiness. We can here perceive an ethereal 
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air of a kind which makes us feel we are in the neighborhood of, for 
example, DSgen’s position which finds expression in his above cited: “We 
meet a leap-year one in four. Cocks crow at four in the morning”; and 
also, “I don’t have a single strand of the Buddha’s Dharma. I now while 
away my time, accepting whatever may come.”
But, in spite of all this, Nietzsche’s eternal return docs not make Time 
be truly Time. He also speaks of the “instant” as a momentary eycblink 
(Augenblick), but his idea of the instant, with its background of eternal 
return, does not imply the bottomlessness of the genuine moment. Hence, 
it cannot signify the place where something truly new can occur. As 
I have said before, the historicity of history cannot here break through 
to its full fruition.
What is, then, the reason for this all? It lies, in this case also, in the 
fact that some “entity” like the will-to-power is still conceived of on a 
suprahistorical plane. Of course, it is not conceived of as a “being” like 
the God of Christianity: it is not the absolute ground of being but the 
principle of absolute becoming. It is also not regarded as something 
objective. Rather, our own self is, as such, none other than a manifestation 
of that Will itself. We can possibly say that, seen fundamentally, will-to- 
power is a position similar to that of the mystical unity of Brahman and 
atman, to which the ancient Indians gave expression by saying, about 
Brahman, “That art thou” (tai team asi). If the similarity is valid, it is 
certainly an important step forward.
And yet, insofar as what is here at stake is a “will,” that is, something 
conceived of in the third person as an “it,” it sdll docs not rid itself of the 
character of entity, something that is.
Although we can say there that our own self is, in fact, That, we cannot 
yet confirm and affirm that That is, in truth, our own self. In other words, 
although one can say it is one’s “self which is not self” one cannot yet say 
it is one’s “self which is not self”. There is here a basic difference between 
Nietzsche’s position and the position of Zen, in which it could be said, for 
example, that the ec-sistence of “body-and-mind dropped off; dropped off 
body-and-mind” is the King-of*samadhis  Samadhi of one’s self as such, 
with one’s eyes lying horizontally and one’s nose sitting vertically.
That the will-to-power involves within it something which is not yet 
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completely turned back into the "self” indicates that it remains in the 
state of being represented as something that is. If it would have been a 
standpoint completely turned about into the self, there would not remain, 
on the ec-static supra-historical plane of the existence in the King Samadhi, 
a single strand susceptible of being represented as what is. Then, Time 
would be disclosed in its authentic aspect of truly bottomlessly arising as 
time and History in its authentic aspect in which historicity thoroughly 
comes into its own.
The domain of this "self,” this "time,” and this “history” is the domain 
in which body-and-mind fallen away, fallen away body-and-mind, and 
samsara-nw-nirvana obtains—the domain of emptiness. This is, at the 
same time, the standpoint of real and complete actuality.
In contradistinction, Nietzsche’s position, insofar as it substituted a 
life-giving power of the Will for the God of Christianity, could not but 
display, together with a keen modernity, a regression to mythos. Such 
concepts as eternal return and Dionysos are proof of this regression. This 
step can be said to have deprived his conception of time of its historicity 
as well as its actuality.
Contrarily, Hakuin, for example, in his Zen comments on the term 
"time” in the Heart Sutra, after saying that “this also gouges out per­
fectly good flesh,” adds three comments:
"Before all the kalpas (world times) past and after all the ones to come.” 
"A marvellous spiritual light glints with austere chill in the sheath of 
a hair-splitting blade.”
"A round gem, shining in dark night, is brought out on its tray.”
To these he adds a Zen verse:
Yesterday at dawn I swept the soot of the old year away, 
Tonight I grind and knead flour for the New Year’s goodies. 
There’s a pine-tree with its roots, an orange with leaves, 
Then I don new clothes and await the coming guests.17
17 Dokugo Shmgyo (Hakuin’i Zen commentary on the Htart Sutra).
Hakuin’s words are enough to give us a glimpse how utterly actual
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“time” is in Buddhism and on what position the possibility of this thor­
oughly realistic view of time is based.
I said before that the historical character of history can radically 
realize itself precisely in the standpoint of “emptiness.” It is to this I 
should like to turn in the next chapter.
Translated by Yamamoto Seisaku 
and Reverend Jan van Bragt
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